Risks from extreme weather events are mediated through state, civil society and individual action 1, 2 . We propose evolving social contracts as a primary mechanism by which adaptation to climate change proceeds. We use a natural experiment of policy and social contexts of the UK and Ireland affected by the same meteorological event and resultant flooding in November 2009. We analyse data from policy documents and from household surveys of 356 residents in western Ireland and northwest England. We find significant differences between perceptions of individual responsibility for protection across the jurisdictions and between perceptions of future risk from populations directly affected by flooding events. These explain differences in stated willingness to take individual adaptive actions when state support retrenches. We therefore show that expectations for state protection are critical in mediating impacts and promoting longer-term adaptation. We argue that making social contracts explicit may smooth pathways to effective and legitimate adaptation.
directly affected will have much to say about planning into the future 12, 13 . Hence we conclude, in line with ref. 14, for example, that extreme events can have significant roles in both small regulatory changes and in large political upheavals. Renegotiations of social contracts are therefore probably a primary mechanism for both adaptation and transformation.
The purpose of this study is to examine the changing social contract where the vulnerability of citizens is being altered by changing weather extremes. Such changes happen when the status quo is disrupted by major catastrophic events such as floods. Previous research on flooding shows significant social differentiation in populations vulnerable to flood risk, and their differential access to services and insurance 15, 16 . Across different exposures to risk, experience of flooding has also been demonstrated to have significant impacts on perceptions of responsibility for action 17, 18 . A natural experiment of exposure to extreme flood events occurred across Ireland and in Cumbria, northwest England in November 2009. Of course this natural disaster occurred at a time of significant economic crisis in both economies and a profound renegotiation of implicit state responsibility around social protection and economic management, particularly acute in Ireland.
Following on from a very wet summer in the British Isles, a stream of Atlantic depressions moved across Britain and Ireland through the autumn of 2009. An atmospheric river established by mid November and became entrained in the westerly circulation 19 . During the month of November in Ireland, and in particular 16-20th November in Cumbria, record-breaking rainfall was recorded in both countries 20 , resulting in widespread flooding, with property loss, economic disruption and a small number of fatalities. Flood events in both jurisdictions were well beyond the experience of living memory. Flooding in Cumbria has been associated with a return period of 2,100 years 21 , and the flood event for the river Suck in Ireland has been estimated as having a return period in excess of 1,000 years 22 . We designed a study to explore the success of, and changes to social contracts following the 2009 floods in both jurisdictions. We implemented a survey of households eight months after the event, stratified by direct experience of flooding and adjacent less-affected households. In addition, we documented perceptions of government performance in dealing with the aftermath; perceptions of fairness in response; and willingness to take action, using a range of socio-cognitive constructs.
We also analysed policy documents and statements from governments, flood advocacy groups and media reports.
The main features of social contracts associated with flood risk in Ireland and England are outlined in Table 1 , based on the documentary analysis. They differ in subtle but significant ways: by • Develop planning guidelines and development control.
Local Authorities:
• Implement flood management works.
• Responsible for operating and maintaining flood forecasting and warning.
• Manage planning permission and therefore development in flood risk areas (in line with Planning Policy Guidance 25).
• Manage planning permission and therefore development in flood risk areas.
• Liaise with Local Resilience Forums on emergency planning.
• Develop and coordinate emergency response (with Health services and Gardai).
• • Obtain flood insurance if the risk of flooding is no worse than 1 in 75 annual probability of flooding (subject to change in 2013).
• Obtain flood insurance but there are not laws or protocols obligating insurance companies to provide insurance.
• Make changes to their property to reduce the risk of flooding.
• Move away from a flood risk area.
• Participate in consultation processes regarding planning and flood defences.
• Participate in consultation processes regarding planning and flood defences. Individuals: can join local interest groups, contribute to fund-raising efforts, join charities, lobby councillors and members of parliament.
Individuals: can join local interest groups, contribute to fund-raising efforts, or join charities, lobby councillors and members of parliament.
the mechanisms by which representation occurs, the responsibilities devolved to individuals, and in government intervention in insurance markets. In England, the legislative setting for the social contract related to flooding sits in a much wider context of civil protection and management; for example, emergency planning and response is set out in the Civil Contingency Act (CCA) of 2004 (see Table 1 ). This context affects how individuals perceive responsibility and demand change when events occur.
The survey results indicate that it is primarily the differing contexts across jurisdictions that bear a significant influence on the evolution of the social contract. Independently of direct experience of flooding, householders expect government to be responsible for reducing future flood occurrence (Z = 14.15, p < 0.001), although householders were also ascribed some responsibility, significantly more in Cumbria than in Galway (χ2 = 20.49, p < 0.001; see Fig. 1a) .
We find contrasting evidence on the influence of direct experience of flooding on individuals' perceptions of future risk and responsibility to act. Overall, very similar proportions of flooded and non-flooded respondents in Cumbria believed, or did not believe respectively, that they would experience a similar event in the next five years (χ2 = 0.20, p > 0.05). The difference was considerably starker in Galway: those who had experienced direct flooding were significantly more likely to believe they would be affected by flooding again, in comparison with those who had not been flooded (Fig. 1b; χ2 = 39.32, p < 0.001) . Of those who had experienced flooding and believed they would be affected again in the foreseeable future, Cumbrians indicated a stronger sense of personal duty and willingness to adapt through modification of their homes (χ2 = 3.62, p < 0.05; for peace of mind as well as for insurance) than Galway respondents (Fig. 1c) .
There are significant differences in perceptions of fairness in its dimensions of fair outcome and fair process. When asked whether respondents agreed that everyone in their community received the same level of flood protection before November 2009, 45% of respondents in Galway agreed that they had and in Cumbria 32% of respondents agreed (χ2 = 5.05, p < 0.05). Following the flood, not all households were treated equally. When asked if everyone in their community had received help promptly following the flood, 74% of respondents in Cumbria agreed, but in Galway less than half of respondents agreed with this statement (44%; χ2 = 44.12, p < 0.001). With regards to the allocation of resources, 74% of respondents in Cumbria felt resources had been distributed to those who needed them the most, and again, in Galway this number was smaller with 56% agreeing (χ2 = 10.19, p < 0.01).
In Galway authorities were deemed to be falling short of the responsibilities expected by their citizens as part of the social contract, resulting in a sense of helplessness among sections of the population. This helplessness is then manifest in an unwillingness to take personal responsibility for flood protection. Reliance on charitable organizations, outside the formal humanitarian aid provided, was a source of government-directed anger from many Galway respondents and seen as a failure of government to meet the needs of the most vulnerable. The government's response in Ireland has been widely critiqued, fostering resentment and leading to litigation: affected Irish citizens initiated legal proceedings against authorities 23, 24 . Liability has not been so critically contested in Cumbria where there are processes to help ensure that charitable organizations work with formal institutions both during and following flood events (such as Cumbria's Council for Voluntary Services) 25 . Actions taken by services on behalf of and funded by government, however, were not necessarily perceived as help from the state. To some extent, government action may be camouflaged by different interpretations on lines of command. Hence, perceptions of responsibility, even if they deviate from the policy landscape, are important in how individuals experience and negotiate the social contract.
Cumbrians surveyed, in contrast, manifest greater resilience in the face of recurrent adversity. This seems to stem as a response to previous experience of dealing with flooding in the context of a peculiar-but rapidly evolving-social contract. In other words, the relationship between past and recent experiences of flooding and their management, through significant past policy developments (for example, the Pitt Report 26 , government's response to the 2007 floods) as well as imminent changes, is reflected in their willingness to adapt.
Context is therefore crucial. The expectations of present and future social contracts influence perceptions and behaviours; concurrently, social contracts develop in response to the specific jurisdictional circumstances in which they apply.
We find that adaptation options for changing risks are mediated by the social contract between state and citizen in every risk context. This means that vulnerable communities, where possible, use the means of political representation to create change that deals with the risks. At present, the government and insurance sector in England are renegotiating significant changes to flood insurance cover related to public management. A move towards risk-sensitive insurance would represent a significant development of the social contract, in terms of responsibility for adaptation between state, market and individuals but could also alter the profile of moral hazard (given that public consultation induces government emphasis on the more vulnerable that voice their concerns) 27, 28 . Such developments may lead to unjust outcomes: underpinning these discussions are tensions extant in the English context, where millions already inhabit areas prone to flooding. Were flood insurance to become unavailable or unaffordable, relocation to low-risk areas may be curtailed for those with limited resources and choice 29 . Where underlying economic structures shape risk and responsibilities, adaptation is a contested process constituted by a series of related but not concatenated events. Fairness, blame and liability therefore become dominant discourses among citizens who may be made more vulnerable by shifts in responsibility of states. We find in particular, that the expectation of the social contract on flood risk was breached in Ireland as a result of the 2009 floods, but is unlikely in either England or Ireland to be renegotiated to enshrine long-term resilience, given constraints on public sector financing of key agencies in both countries. Although individual extreme events, such as the floods in Cumbria or Galway, cannot solely be ascribed to a climate-change influence, there is increasing evidence for a higher likelihood of more precipitation extremes due to anthropogenic warming 30 . Hence, we argue that climate-change adaptation is likely to proceed as a series of crises that are likely to disrupt planning and adaptation processes as instant solutions are sought.
LETTERS
This study sets an agenda for researching renegotiation of social contracts between citizens and states as a primary mechanism for adaptation. There are benefits to expanding methods in this area beyond detecting and forensically examining evolving contracts towards, for example, action-oriented research to provide platforms for transformative action with communities and political processes. This study also points to the fundamental importance of specific events as threshold elements in turning incremental adaptation into transformational change. Such thresholds are likely to be detected in many climate-change risks. If social contracts can be fruitfully negotiated through enhancing collective responsibility and citizenship, adaptation is likely to advance more smoothly and at less real cost to vulnerable groups.
Methods
We developed a survey and piloted it in the study areas in June and July 2010 in Ireland and in September 2010 in Cumbria. The main survey was administered face-to-face with individuals from households who had either directly experienced (at their place of residence at the time) flooding or not experienced flooding in November 2009, in selected geographical areas: during 9-23 August 2010 in Galway (west Ireland) in Ballinasloe, Claregalway, Athenry and Gort; and 18-30 September 2010 in Cumbria (northwest England) in Keswick, Cockermouth, Braithwaite and Workington. The questionnaire used was identical in both regions, with the exception of references to location-specific organizations and agencies.
Respondents were stratified into flooded and non-flooded areas, and surveyed every third house in randomly selected roads (with the exception of smaller settlements in Ireland where, owing to the small numbers of households flooded, every house was approached), at different times during the day. No-response households (or individuals who indicated interest in participating in the survey but were otherwise engaged at the time) received a paper copy of the survey that was collected later by the research team. A maximum of one interview with an adult per address was undertaken. Each interview took approximately 20 min to complete. No incentives for participation were offered.
In analysing the differences between locations and groups, we conducted non-parametric tests including Chi-squared (χ2) to examine the differences between groups (flooded/non-flooded and Galway/Cumbria) and the Wilcoxon signed rank test (Z ) to test within groups in the survey. The significance of all results was assessed at the 0.05 level.
